Does choosing between electoral rules also mean choosing between electing women or immigrant origin candidates? Most research assumes that systems which maximize proportionality PR, large magnitudes and open lists maximize descriptive representation.
Show Context Citation Context The relationship between legislative seats and citizen votes is a longstanding concern in democratic theory e.
Constitutionally mandated reapportionment and shifting patterns of partisanship have cr Carrubba - American Journal of Political Science" In parliamentary democracies, participating in government provides access to office perks and policy influence.
Because of this, as Riker demonstrated, there is a powerful logic behind the formation of minimum winning coalitions. Thus, an important question is why we regularly observe oversiz Thus, an important question is why we regularly observe oversized coalitions.
While several theories of coalition formation have been proposed, few have been tested in competition with one another. This article offers a simultaneous test of five main theories of coalition formation using data from 24 countries over the period from to The weight of the evidence suggests that oversized governments form when maintaining coalition bargains is harder Carrubba and Volden Finally, while we descriptively observe oversized connected coalitions Axelrodthe logic behind their formation appears to differ from what Axelrod proposes.
InWilliam Riker argued powerfully for the expectation that governments should form minimum winning coalitions. Adding more parties would only force the otherwise minimum winning coalition MWC to give up benefits unnecessarily. Scarritt - American Political Science Review" Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems sepa-rately or jointly?
We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the numberof electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables district magnitude and prox-imity of pre We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the numberof electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables district magnitude and prox-imity of presidential and legislative electionsone intervening variable effective number of presidential candidatesand two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups fragmentation and concentration.
Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However, the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest amount of variance in the number of parties.
Do electoral institutions and ethnopoliticalcleavages shape the structure the fragmenta-tion or concentration of party systems sepa-rately or jointly?
If they shape the structure of party systems jointly, how can this joint effect be theoreti- Show Context Citation Context And proportional formulas predictably tend to increase the number of parties but only in ethnically heterogeneous societies and not in ethnically homogeneous ones Ordeshook and Shvetsova A growing consensus has emerged that proportional democracies produce more ideological congruence be-tween their citizens and representatives than majoritarian democracies.
But is this consensus open to ques-tion? We argue that it is.
As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congruin , prescribes a single-district, multi-member plurality system for municipalities with fewer than 3, inhabitants and a form of “fortified” proportional representation for those with 3, or .
David M. Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems, Chapter 2.
THE FIRST PAST THE POST ELECTORAL SYSTEM. Depending on which author one reads the first past the post (FPTP) electoral system is known by a number of titles such as 'plurality', 'relative majority', 'simple majority' or 'single member . It is most common to think of plurality in the context of single-member plurality elections, but we can also have plurality-based outcomes in a multi-seat district, with the most common form of such an electoral rule called plurality bloc voting, in which each voter may cast a single vote for M (or up to M) candidates.
in , prescribes a single-district, multi-member plurality system for municipalities with fewer than 3, inhabitants and a form of “fortified” proportional representation for those with 3, or more inhabitants.
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems Ernesto Calvo University of Maryland Timothy Hellwig Indiana University In a seminal article, Cox () suggested that electoral systems with larger district magnitudes provide incentives for parties to .
single-member district plurality. This evidence should not be interpreted as support for the case for categorical choice-based electoral systems: it only shows that one.